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Abstract 
 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) can provide a valuable service for the capital markets if 
they deliver a credible assessment of the relative probability of default of credit financial 
instruments that enables investors to reduce the information asymmetry. CRAs have had 
an indisputable role in accentuating the crisis, and preventative regulation of CRAs has 
emerged as crucial and necessary, becoming a priority in all high-level policy decisions in 
Europe and worldwide. This thesis will first present a brief overview, defining credit rating 
concept, giving an account on market leaders and history of CRAs. Then the researcher 
critically examines the regulatory approach adopted by the EU since the first calls to regu-
late CRAs in Europe. Some of the US initiatives will also be reviewed in order give a more 
comprehensive assessment for regulating the credit-rating activity as a whole. As the re-
search progresses, it becomes abundant, that CRAs cannot predict whether a particular 
default occurs, thus, perhaps over-reliance on CRAs is one the main causes why CRAs 
bolster the financial disruptions. However, there are many ethical problems to overcome in 
relation to CRAs: conflict of interest, moral hazard, information asymmetry, and even when 
some are eliminated, for instance free rider problem may arise. There is no ideal solution 
for CRA business model – the existing model wisely combines issuer-pays and investor-
pays approaches. As for regulation, a European CRA has been considered, but feasibility 
analysis has shown such may be costly or even pose another ethical threat. Newly created 
ESMA has to gain more experience to continue tackling CRAs issues. 
Keywords Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs), credit rating, ESMA, EBA, 
EIOPA, IOSCO, SEC, FSB, BCBS, conflict of interest, Enron, 
Issuer-Pays model, EU regulatory framework. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Credit Rating and Credit Rating Agency (CRA) 
 
As Langohr pointed out in his publication “The Rating Agencies and their Credit Rat-
ings, What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, there is no indus-
try definition or standard to describe credit ratings, and no trade association of Credit 
Ratings Agencies (CRAs). During the 2003 – 2006 institutions worldwide attempted to 
define the credit rating concept (Langohr, 2008). 
 
At a global level, securities supervisors grouped in the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) had set out various concepts in the IOSCO Code, 
such as those of “rating agency” and “rating”. Despite the voluntary nature of the 
IOSCO Code, these definitions implied international standardisation and were adapted 
by European legislators (Garcia, 2012). Both IOSCO and the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR)1, claim a “credit rating – is an opinion regarding the cre-
ditworthiness of an entity, a credit commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer 
of such obligations. They are not recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold any secu-
rity” (Langohr, 2008). 
 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a Credit Rating Agency 
as “a firm that provides its opinion on the creditworthiness of an entity and the financial 
obligations … issued by an entity. Generally, credit ratings distinguish between invest-
ment grade and non-investment grade (SEC, 2013). 
 
In the Official Journal of the EU in 2006 European Commission (EC) states that CRAs 
issue opinions on the creditworthiness of a particular issuer or financial instrument. 
They assess the likelihood that an issuer will default either on its financial obligations 
generally or on a particular debt or fixed income security (EC, 2006). 
According to the memo on New Rules on CRAs, published in Brussels, 16 January 
2013, the EC clarifies the concept once again: a credit rating is an opinion issued by a 
specialised firm on the creditworthiness of an entity or a debt instrument. A credit rat-
ing agency (CRA) is a service provider specialised in the provision of credit ratings on 
                                               
1
 On January 1, 2011, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) officially be-
came the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
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a professional basis (EC, 2013a). 
As claimed by the Bank of England Finacial Stabilty Report of 2007, there are at least 
three essential tasks CRAs serve the financial system and should retain: 
 
(i) Ratings can help mitigate the fundamental information asymmetry in capital 
markets between investors and firms seeking external financing. 
(ii) Ratings can be a useful mechanism to solve some principal agent problems. 
(iii) Ratings can be used to solve collective action problems between dispersed 
bond investors (Bank of England, 2007). 
 
 
1.2 The Big Three 
 
A more objective interpretation of credit rating concept may be formulated by reviewing 
how CRAs represent themselves (Langohr, 2008). The largest three rating agencies 
are Standard & Poor's, Moody’s and Fitch. They cover approximately 95% of the world 
market. Smaller rating agencies make up the remaining part (EC, 2013a).  
 
Market Share by Credit Rating Agency                                                         (Figure 1) 
 
The largest market shares are allocated amongst S&P (44,82%), Moody’s (38,25) and 
Fitch (13,35%). 
 
Original source: US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website, http://www.sec.gov/  (Accessed 18 Apr. 
2013) 
Secondary source: Foley, Stephen “Rating agencies: Outlook unchanged.” Financial Times, 14 Jan. 2013, 25 Mar. 2013  
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/38d48444-5e3d-11e2-a771-00144feab49a.html#axzz2QnNFC8lY>. 
 
 
Many studies have concluded, that this market is a natural oligopoly (CESR, 2005) as 
the nature of the CRA market makes it complicated for new CRAs to succeed and for 
existing CRAs to conquer a larger market share. Issuers prefer ratings from reputable 
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CRAs, while investors respect CRAs with a history of accurate and timely ratings – thus 
it results in a lack of competition (Garcia, 2013). 
 
 
Credit Rating Definition by the Big Three CRAs                                           (Table 1) 
Fitch Ratings 
Definition 
Moody’s Ratings 
Definition 
Standard & Poor 
Ratings Definition 
“Fitch Ratings' credit ratings provide 
an opinion on the relative ability of 
an entity to meet financial commit-
ments… Credit ratings, as opinions 
on relative ranking of vulnerability to 
default, do not imply or convey a 
specific statistical probability of de-
fault, notwithstanding the agency's 
published default histories that may 
be measured against ratings at the 
time of default. Credit ratings are 
opinions on relative credit quality 
and not a predictive measure of spe-
cific default probability.” (Fitch, 
2013). 
Moody’s rates and pub-
lishes independent 
credit opinions on fixed-
income securities, issu-
ers of securities and 
other credit obliga-
tions… 
  
Investors use Moody’s 
ratings to help price the 
credit risk of fixed-
income securities or 
debts they may buy, sell 
or lend.” (Moody’s 
2013). 
 
”A credit rating is 
Standard & Poor's 
opinion on the 
general creditwor-
thiness of an obli-
gor, or the credit-
worthiness of an 
obligor with re-
spect to a particu-
lar debt security or 
other financial 
obligation.” 
(Standard & 
Poor’s 2013a). 
 
The table above demonstrates the variation between each CRAs definition. Fitch 
stresses that ratings are relative and concerned with default. Fitch definition emphasiz-
es the distinction between the probability that default occurs and the potential loss to 
the investor. Moody’s accents on the independence of its opinion, which deals with 
credit risk. S&P ratings incorporate creditworthiness. The big three CRAs all describe a 
credit rating as an opinion about whether the issuer of a fixed income security will pay 
amounts due on time and in full. The common conception is that ratings attempt to ana-
lyse the issuer’s likelihood to default (Fitch, Moodys, Standard & Poor’s 2013). 
 
1.3 Rating Category  
 
CRAs rank securities and issuers on a relative scale. For example, Fitch and S&P use 
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB… while Moody’s goes with Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba… CRAs also 
use modifiers (such as ‘+’ or ‘−’; ‘1, 2, or 3’) appended to the rating categories in order 
to denote relative status within the major rating categories. The combination of a cate-
gory (for example ‘A’) and a modifier (such as ‘+’) constitutes a ‘notch’ in the rating 
scale (for instance ‘A +’). A change of a rating means assigning a credit rating a differ-
ent notch in the rating scale. Categories do not reflect absolute measures of risk, only 
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that securities classified in a higher category have higher quality than those in the cat-
egories below (Garcia, 2012). 
 
1.4 Rating Types 
ESMA has defined three broad categories of rating types that have been broken down 
into the following segments:  
 Corporate ratings: financial institutions – including banks, brokers, and dealers 
– insurances, other corporate issuers;  
 Structured finance ratings: asset-backed securities (ABS), residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), asset-backed commercial papers 
(ABCP);  
 Sovereign and public finance ratings: sovereign, other local governments, mu-
nicipalities, supranational organizations, and public entities (Garcia, 2012). 
 
1.5 Credit Assessment Methodology 
CRAs differ in their methodologies and models employed to arrive at the rating. Some 
base their ratings principally on default probability, whilst others use the concept of 
expected loss. In relation to the EU, Article 8.3 provides that a CRA shall use method-
ologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on 
historical experience, including back-testing (Garcia, 2012). 
1.6 Credit Rating Process 
A small number of CRAs use the model-driven approach, focusing on quantitative data 
that they incorporate into a mathematical model to produce their ratings. In analyst-
driven system, credit rating professionals conduct a review of the financial perfor-
mance, policies, and risk management strategies as well as of the business and eco-
nomic environment in which the issuer operates. In addition to evaluating financial da-
ta, credit analysts typically weigh qualitative information (Standard & Poor’s, 2013b). 
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Analyst-Driven Rating Process by Standard & Poor’s                  (Figure 2) 
 
Standard & Poor’s website, About Credit Ratings Section, “What Credit Ratings Are & Are Not.” 19 Apr. 2013, 
<http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/Images/SP_RatingsProcess_large.gif>. 
 
1.7 The Rise of CRA Era 
Credit rating as a profession dates back to the beginning of the 20th century in the 
USA. It is also where regulation of this business first developed, and also where the 
root of the current crisis lies (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
 
Three types of businesses emerged in the 19th century: the specialized financial press, 
credit reporting agencies and investment bankers. One of the first publications was The 
American Railroad Journal, started in 1832, which was transformed in 1949 into a pub-
lication for investors in railroads by Henry Poor. In the meantime Poor set up his own 
firm, collecting statistics on US railroad companies. The company published the results 
annually as the Manual of the Railroads of the US. One of the first credit reporting 
agencies, founded in 1841, was The Mercantile Agency, selling its service to subscrib-
ers (Sylla, 2002). 
 
In 1909, John Moody initiated agency bond ratings in the US, which was a pioneer to 
include credit risk analysis for rating purposes. Originally, this only covered the bonded 
debt of the US railroad companies (Sylla, 2002). 
 
Post war prosperity of 1960s, made CRAs relatively unimportant. CRAs expanded rap-
idly again during the 1970s as the Bretton Woods System collapsed and a new era of 
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financial globalisation emerged together with liberalisation of capital flows and redistri-
bution of OPEC wealth, resulting in a greater number of sovereign states and private 
corporations, issuing bonds. However, the agencies shifted to issuer-pays model. This 
was the point when SEC in 1973 designated certain CRAs as Nationally Recognised 
Statistical Ratings Organisations (NRSROs), raising further concerns of NRSROs 
“abusing” their power for regulatory purposes (Sylla, 2002).   
 
1.8 Calls to Regulate CRAs Worldwide 
 
As Langohr remarks, CRAs can’t foresee if a particular default occurs. When cata-
strophic default disasters struck South-East Asia in 1997, the US in 2001 – 2002, and 
Europe in 2002 – 2003, the CRAs only spotted them at the last minute. Papaikonomou 
wrote “the regulation of credit-rating activity and CRAs has become a top priority on all 
regional and international policy makers”…since the outbreak of the crisis. The topic 
has also been a recurring feature in most financial market experts’ reports and recom-
mendations published during the last two years [2008-2010]” (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
 
CRAs started to adopt a voluntary code of conduct worldwide. In April 2002, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) mandated the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) to analyze the issue of CRAs (EC, 2006). Later, in December 2005 the EC 
produced Communication on CRAs (Langohr, 2008). Across the Atlantic, the US CRA 
Reform Act of 2006, established a legal framework for the registration of NRSROs 
(aimed to improve ratings quality by fostering accountability, transparency and competi-
tion) actually empowering the SEC with greater monitoring authority. Papaikonomou 
observes the SEC had adopted additional rules to date rulemaking developed for 
transparency and to decrease the reliance on NRSROs (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
 
Papaikonomou continues – the role of CRAs in the crisis, the unsatisfactory self-
regulation and market failure, all had bolstered the EC to propose a regulation on 
CRAs in November 2008. This decision was consistent with the March 2008 “ECOFIN 
roadmap”, one of whose four main objectives was to “investigate structural market is-
sues, such as the role played by CRAs and the originate and distribute model”. How-
ever, the author is not entirely convinced that those hectic changes to the EU CRA leg-
islation are sufficient to address the problems (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Periodicals and CRAs 
Worthless AAA ratings given by the Big Three (Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch 
Group) have been aired in the news headlines as an attempt to unveil the roots of the 
financial turmoil.  
 
Pool of outstanding debt rated triple-A by all three agencies                  (Figure 3) 
 
Financial Times, Crisis-hit Europe dominates rating losers, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2caf9a06-9622-11e2-9ab2-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OgunTUqP> (accessed 29 March 2013). 
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The figure above, Shifts in the Global Credit Ratings Map published by the FT’s analy-
sis, discloses:  
 
How – unlike previous financial crises since the second world war – much of the 
damage wrought by volatile banking or financial systems and weak public financ-
es has been focused on advanced western economies, especially in Europe. At 
the bottom is crisis-hit southern Europe, including Greece, whose creditors last 
year faced steep losses under the country’s debt restructuring” (Atkins, 2013a). 
 
2.2 Langohr’s Perspective on Credit Rating Concept 
 
Langohr gives a pragmatic view on a concept of a credit rating in his publication “The 
Rating Agencies and their Credit Ratings, What They Are, How They Work and Why 
They Are Relevant”. As the author wrote, there is no industry deﬁnition or standard to 
describe credit ratings, and no trade association of CRAs. He suggests considering 
definitions given by various international bodies related to CRAs (Langohr, 2008).  
 
2.3 Papaikonomou’s Perspective – Need for a Paradigm Shift 
 
Papaikonomou clarifies a concept of a paradigm shift as: “a complete change in way of 
thinking or in a belief system that allows the creation of a new condition previously 
thought impossible or unacceptable”. The focus of his paper is the new EU rules on 
CRAs (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
 
2.4 Garcia’s Perspective on Regulation of CRAs in the EU 
Garcia’s publication explores weaknesses of CRAs in relation to asset-backed securi-
ties’ ratings and concludes with the policy discussions around the ratings of EU sover-
eign bonds. The book discusses other models as alternatives to the issuer-pays model 
to address conflicts of interest and enhance competition, including the creation of a 
public European rating agency (Garcia, 2012). 
 
2.5 European Supervisory Framework 
 
Figure 3 represents European Systemic Risk Board. 
 
 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)                  (Figure 4) 
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ESMA website, European Supervisory Framework, <http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/European-Supervisory-
Framework> (accessed 29 March 2013). 
 
The European supervisory framework incorporates: 
 The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which monitors and assess potential 
threats to financial stability. 
 The European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), based in Paris. 
 The European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London. 
 The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) based in 
Frankfurt (ESMA, 2013b). 
 
2.5.1 The European Commission (EC) 
 
As the European Commission (EC) is the driving force in proposing legislation (to Par-
liament and the Council), it holds an essential role when it comes to CRAs regulations.2  
 
2.5.2 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
 
On 7 December 2009, the EU Regulation 1060/09 on CRAs entered into effect. Follow-
ing the announcement of the creation of ESMA3, the CRA Regulation was revised in 
                                               
2
 Most of CRA related communication is published on the EC’s website 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/rating-agencies/index_en.htm>. 
10 
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December 2010 [to give] ESMA an exclusive responsibility for the registration and su-
pervision of CRAs in the EU, in cooperation with EBA, EIOPA and IOSCO. ESMA con-
tributes to the work of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), by providing data 
and undertaking stress tests in close co-ordination with the fellow ESA's and the ESRB 
(ESMA, 2013a). 
 
2.5.3 The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) has officially come into being as of 1 January 
2011 and has taken over all existing and ongoing tasks and responsibilities from the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The EBA safeguards public val-
ues: the stability of the financial system, the transparency of markets and financial 
products and the protection of depositors and investors (EBA, 2013). 
 
2.5.4 The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
 
EIOPA is the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. Article 9 of 
Regulation 1094/2010 establishing EIOPA requires EIOPA to take a “leading role” in 
promoting transparency, simplicity and fairness in the market for consumer financial 
products or services across the internal market (EIOPA, 2013). 
3 Research Plan 
 
Despite the existence of CRAs for almost a century, their role has become ever more 
ambiguous in the past two decades. Business schools sometimes bring up Enron 
Scandal as a role model – where unethical decisions can destroy shareholder wealth 
(Elizabeth Schaumann, 2010). After a collapse of Enron and a recent financial crisis 
the reputation of CRAs has undergone a significant turmoil. 
 
CRAs monitoring bodies number has been growing and those have been exceptionally 
active in developing new regulations and agendas. This conveys evidence: the system 
in need of a considerable change is being continuously altered by formulated organisa-
tions. Brooke (2012) states that CRAs were not regulated in Europe until year 2011, 
                                                                                                                                         
3
 On January 1, 2011, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) officially became the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
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when the EU began requiring them to register with ESMA. However, regulatory 
measures imposed by European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) provoked 
fierce objections: 
 
The BVI [which represents the German asset management industry] said it was 
“stunning” that Esma had already drawn regulatory conclusions for Ucits in a num-
ber of areas where political debate had not properly started. (Flood, 2012). 
 
Both the BVI and Aima [Alternative Investment Management Association] ex-
pressed concerns about Esma’s new rules governing strategy indices used by 
growing numbers of Ucits to track the performance of hedge fund managers. 
(Flood, 2012). 
 
Given the research question of this thesis CRAs – An Analysis of European Regulatory 
Framework, an overview on the European Union’s unregulated background of CRAs 
will be presented followed by recent regulatory framework in the EU and to some ex-
tent – international initiatives – coupled with suggestions for further developments to 
enhance credit ratings accuracy. 
 
Relevant information for this research subject is available in public libraries as well as 
online databases: Ebrary, ProQuest, SpringerLink, Oxford Analytics, Google Stats, 
Periodicals amongst others. There are textbooks covering CRAs, quite a few articles 
and plenty of websites of relevant regulatory bodies. Mainly qualitative data will be re-
viewed and to some extent quantitative data derived from secondary sources will be 
analysed. 
4 Analysis of the EU CRA Regulation in International Context 
4.1 International Bodies 
After Asian crisis in the late 1990s or the Enron bankruptcy in 2001, The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Technical Committee, on its own 
initiative or at the request of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) – [now ESMA], thoroughly reviewed CRA ac-
tivity. In this context, the CESR (ESMA) and The European Securities Markets Expert 
Group (ESME) delivered reports to the EC on the activity of CRAs. These develop-
ments were reflected in a European Parliament’s resolution on CRAs of February 2004, 
and EC’s Communication (EC, 2006). Meanwhile, IOSCO and CESR (ESMA) contin-
ued reviewing CRAs activity and code compliance (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
12 
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4.1.1 The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
 
Globally, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) includes 
over 100 securities commissions (IOSCO, 2012). The counterpart of the SEC in the EU 
is the ESMA (Scalet, 2012). 
 
In September 2003, IOSCO Principles were published for securities regulators, CRAs, 
and market participants to improve investor protection, fairness, efficiency and trans-
parency; and to reduce systemic risk. When developing the principles, IOSCO 
acknowledged that CRAs were regulated differently in each jurisdiction, and allowed 
CRAs to decide on the best way to give effect to the principle (Garcia, 2012).  
 
In December 2004 IOSCO developed “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rat-
ing Agencies”. In May 2008, the 2004 code of conduct was updated in order to address 
the problems that emerged in the credit markets (IOSCO, 2008a). In March 2009, the 
IOSCO reviewed its code implementation throughout the world (IOSCO, 2009). 
 
The Code Fundamentals were developed out of discussions among IOSCO members, 
CRAs, representatives of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, issuers and the public (IOSCO, 
2008b). 
 
4.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), an international forum for the 
world’s leading banking supervisors (McVea, 2010), consists of the Central Bank Gov-
ernors of the Group of 10 nations (Scalet, 2012). 
 
The Basel II Framework comprises a set of standards for establishing minimum capital 
requirements. It was prepared by the BCBS that developed the first standard in 1988 
(Garcia, 2012). As announced in June 2004, BCBS under the supervision of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), assigned credit ratings a central role (Langohr, 
2008).  
 
BCBS permits banks to use ratings from certain accredited CRAs to determine mini-
mum credit risk capital requirements under Pillar I of the Basel Capital Accord (Basel 
13 
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II). In the EU these principles have also been embedded in legal rules as part of the 
EU’s Capital Requirements Directive 2006/48/EC (CRD) (McVea, 2010). In the same 
way, Garcia outlines the CRD is the European implementation of the Basel II frame-
work (Garcia, 2012). 
 
The Basel II framework provides tables that attribute different risk weights to each rat-
ing grade issued by a recognized External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI). As 
stated by the EBA’s guidelines on ECAIs, the ECAI recognition for capital purposes 
does not constitute a form of regulation of ECAIs or a form of licensing of rating agen-
cies to do business in the EU (Garcia, 2012). 
 
A figure below discloses Basel III implementation timeline. 
 
Basel III Implementation Timeline                                                                 (Figure 5) 
 
Barfield, Richard; Dawson, Symon; Loy, Vincent “Basel III and beyond: Don’t make data quality the elephant in the 
room.” PwC report, 2012, <www.pwc.co.uk/banking>. 
 
As part of the global initiatives endorsed by the FSB and the G-20 leaders, BCBS has 
advocated a single set of global financial standards Basel III, as part of a more com-
prehensive response to the financial crisis of 2008 (Scalet, 2012). The text of this re-
form called the Basel III Framework, was issued by the BCBS in December 2010. Ba-
14 
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sel III complements the Basel II and Basel I frameworks but does not replace them 
(Garcia, 2012). 
 
4.1.3 G-20  – The Group of Twenty 
 
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) is the 
premier forum for international cooperation on the global economy and financial agen-
da. 
 
The objectives of the G20 refer to: 
1. Achieve global economic stability, sustainable growth; 
2. Promote financial regulations to reduce risks and prevent future finan-
cial crises; 
3. Modernizing international financial architecture (G-20, 2013a). 
 
4.1.4 Financial Stability Board (FSB)  
The FSB was established in April 2009 as the successor to the Financial Stability Fo-
rum (FSF). The FSF was founded in 1999 by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors. In November 2008, the Leaders of the G20 countries called for a 
larger membership of the FSF (FSB, 2013a). The FSB has been established to coordi-
nate the work of national financial authorities internationally (FSB, 2013b). 
4.1.5 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect in-
vestors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. 
CRAs registered as such with the SEC are known as Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSROs) (SEC, 2013). 
 
4.2 CRA Criticism and Ethics 
 
4.2.1 Self-regulation 
Papaikonomou describes self-regulation of CRAs, as remedial initiatives towards cor-
recting their own practices, adjusting their governance, e.g. by separating credit-rating 
15 
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activity from the provision of other services, modifying their methodologies or improving 
transparency. Remarkable credit-rating downgrades of 2007 and throughout the unfold-
ing of the crisis, with historical downgrades hitting especially structured product ratings, 
demonstrate the over-optimism of CRAs in carrying out their own monitoring (Papai-
konomou, 2010). 
 
4.2.2 Enron Scandal 
 
Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P came under intense criticism after the collapse of Enron in 
December 2001 (Gaillard, 2012). Harry McVea confirms that the most vivid illustration 
of CRA failures in the pre-crisis era was in relation to Enron, where Enron’s credit rat-
ing was only downgraded a few days before the company filed for bankruptcy, despite 
the fact that its difficulties were widely known (McVea, 2010). 
 
Andrew Hill’s article published in Financial Times, “Enron: see no evil, hear no evil, 
speak no evil”, observes: 
 
“When the CRAs downgraded Enron’s debt to junk in late November 2001 (they 
had been holding off in the hope a rival group might buy the energy trader; many 
Wall Street analysts still rated the company a “buy” or “strong buy”), it was bust 
within days” (Hill, 2011). 
 
CRAs provide access to global capital markets by helping a company to identify its 
place in the distributions of its business. CRAs could be regarded as gatekeepers of 
the capital market’s arena (Langohr, 2008). The failure of the gatekeepers to detect 
Enron’s collapse could be reasoned by the “general deterrence” and “bubble market” 
hypothesis. A concept of general deterrence is explained as the decline in the expected 
liability costs that faced auditors who were considering whether or not to acquiesce in 
aggressive accounting policies favoured by managers. While the bubble market con-
cept emphasizes that in an atmosphere of market euphoria gatekeepers have less rel-
evance and, consequently, reduced leverage with their clients (Coffee, 2004). 
 
Langohr calls the major bankruptcies similar to Enron as a period of “financial disinter-
mediation”, whereby major corporations relied increasingly on the bond market to raise 
capital. The shift in the 1980s away from deﬁned-beneﬁt retirement plans to company-
administered defined contribution plans, increased importance on the role of pension 
fund managers, who relied on the judgments of CRAs (Langohr, 2008). 
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Prior to the current crisis, there had been about one ratings crisis every three years in 
the past twenty-two years (Sy, 2009). Calls for regulating the credit-rating industry date 
back to before the Asian crisis in the late 1990s or the Enron bankruptcy in 2001. It is 
the point when its investment-grade debt became questionable. Nevertheless, financial 
markets worldwide continued to rely largely on self-regulation. Papaikonomou is con-
vinced, that self-regulation proved to be inefficient (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
 
After the collapse of Enron, the ECOFIN in April 2002 requested the EC to assess the 
activities of CRAs.  As a result, during 2003 the EC held several discussions on the 
subject in the European Securities Committee (ESC) (ESME, 2008). The EC’s as-
sessment of the regulatory framework for CRAs was that legislative intervention was 
unnecessary. In the 2006 Communication, the EC’s stance was that one of the central 
principles of “Better Regulation” was that legislative solutions should be applied only 
where they are strictly necessary for the achievement of public policy objectives and 
the case for new legislation in this area remained unproven (EC, 2006).  
 
4.2.3 The Collapse of Lehman Brothers 
 
Lannoo observes that a collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was not the first sign that 
CRA industry was to be regulated. CRAs were in primary niches as policy victims of the 
financial crisis. A consultative document was circulated by the EC in six months, which 
institutes a single license for CRAs in the EU, subject to the supervision of the newly 
created ESMA (Lannoo, 2011). 
 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, both the US Treasury and the EC made central 
clearing and exchange trading of standardized over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
mandatory. This principle was also affirmed at the international level by the G20 lead-
ers at the Pittsburgh Summit in November 2009 (G20, 2009). 
 
Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the European Central Bank has made it easier 
to borrow its liquidity against assets with lower credit ratings. The figure below shows 
the effect the financial crisis had on the world’s creditworthiness (Atkins, 2013b). 
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The Effect the Financial Crisis had on the World’s Creditworthiness       (Figure 6) 
 
Atkins, Ralph; Fray, Keith “Dearth of triple A alters investment map.” Financial Times, 26 Mar. 2013, 29 Mar. 2013b 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63ae193c-9628-11e2-9ab2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OgunTUqP>. 
 
As the figure above together with the Appendix (2) A complete Ranking of the Changes 
in Credit Ratings Since 2007 demonstrate – a lack of triple A rated government bonds 
could create shortages in assets used as a collateral when borrowing funds. John Beck 
says global investors should ask whether triple B rated bonds are really still emerging 
markets in the sense they were 10-15 years ago (Atkins, 2013b). Upgrades of emerg-
ing market economies have expanded the pool of government assets rated in the BBB 
range. Now BBB range includes a few fallen European economies. Emerging markets 
were once high risk and high return assets. Now they are mainstream. A further shrink-
age in the pool of AAA ratings could foreshadow a shortage of assets that can be used 
as security when borrowing in capital markets or from central banks (Atkins, 2013c). 
 
4.2.4 Moral Hazard – Information asymmetry 
 
Frank Partnoy argues that information asymmetry between debt issuers and investors 
is one of the major reasons for CRAs existence. The asymmetry takes place when 
sellers have superior information to buyers about product quality and simultaneously 
cannot convey this information to buyers. Prices in a market with information asym-
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metry reflect the average quality of a product, and sellers with superior products, bear-
ing the cost of the information asymmetry, wish to disclose the superior nature of their 
product for charging the highest price (Partnoy, 1999). 
 
Moral hazard problem arises when sellers exaggerate their credibility and provide buy-
ers with false information. CRAs are supposed to serve as a third-party information 
intermediary between debt issuers and investors, helping the market to determine the 
appropriate price.  By “specializing in the gathering, analysis, examination, and dissem-
ination” of information regarding the creditworthiness of an issuer or instrument, CRAs 
“eliminate the duplicative and inefficient efforts of individuals engaging in such activi-
ties” (Partnoy, 1999). However, hot markets and large profits increase the benefits of 
inaccurate, hastily determined ratings (Dennis, 2009), thus enabling CRAs abusing 
their power. 
 
4.2.5 Issuer-Pays and Investor-Pays Business Models 
 
Figure below illustrates Issuer-Pays and Investor-Pays Business Models. 
Issuer-Pays and Investor-Pays Business Models                                        (Figure 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of CRAs nowadays use issuer-pays model to generate revenue, where 
issuer finances the ratings. Only a few small CRAs use investor-pays model, as it used 
to be in the rise of CRA Era (Langohr, 2008).4 
 
                                               
4 See section 4.2.6 on Issuer-Pays Model problems (Conflict of Interest). 
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4.2.6 Conflict of Interest and Free-Rider Problem 
 
The researcher had contacted former Senior President of Moody’s William Harrington 
to hear an expert opinion: 
… Conflict of interest permeates all levels of levels of employment from entry-level 
analyst to the chairman and chief executive officer of Moody’s corporation (Harring-
ton, 2013). 
 
Conflicts of interest are broadly associated with the “issuer pays” model in CRA indus-
try, whereby both issuers and CRAs have an economic interest in ensuring the success 
of the issue: the issuer, in ensuring the sale of its securities; and the CRA – because of 
scale of fees at stake. Thus, ratings became almost a matter of negotiation. Conflict of 
interest problems were worsened by issuers’ willingness to “ratings shop” so as to 
choose which rating to use based on the preliminary rating provided by the agency’s 
ratings committee (McVea, 2010). 
 
The approach of the EU CRA Regulation to the handling of conflicts of interest is set 
out in Annex 1: A CRA shall identify, eliminate or manage and disclose, clearly and 
prominently, any actual or potential conflicts of interest. The Regulation considers that 
the conflict arising from the payments received from rated entities or subscribers 
should not be prohibited; but imposes the measures to address the conflict. For exam-
ple, it is prohibited to buy or sell securities of the rated Issuer  (Garcia, 2012). 
 
While the Subscriber-Pays model may help to mitigate conflict of interest problem of 
Issuer-Pays model, it creates a free-rider problem, as the Subscriber-Pays model relies 
heavily on the ability to enforce property rights to information. Technological develop-
ments are so advanced, that it is a piece of cake to transmit the information to millions 
of other users, who did pay for it (Garcia, 2012). In the long menu of possible causes of 
the credit crisis from which historians will choose, the Issuer-Pays model of the credit 
rating agencies will surely remain a favourite (Foley, 2013). 
 
4.2.7 Issuer Pays Model versus Unsolicited Ratings 
 
While unsolicited ratings may help to mitigate conflict of interest problem – often related 
to issuer-pays model, Papaikonomou observes: not only did the EU regulation omit to 
tackle the issuer-pays problem, it in fact reaffirmed it. The EU adopted a very question-
able provision in the annex, whereby  
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the credit rating agency is obliged to inform the rated entity at least 12 hours be-
fore publication of the credit rating and of the principal grounds on which the rat-
ing is based in order to give the entity an opportunity to draw attention of the 
credit rating agency to any factual errors.  
 
This means that CRAs would now also be obliged to contact issuers who did not pay 
for their ratings. This provision obviously raises concerns about market abuse (Papai-
konomou, 2010). 
 
4.2.8 Transparency and Disclosure 
The lack of adequate information about the characteristics and limitations of the ratings 
is one of the main problems (Garcia, 2012). Financial Times had published an article, 
where it said the three big CRAs must improve their transparency and IT and internal 
controls – the first ESMA inspections of Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch have 
found (Brooke, 2012). 
 
4.3 The First Initiative to Regulate CRAs in the EU 
 
The first initiative to regulate CRAs in the EU was European Parliament’s Resolution 
adopted in February 2004, which asserted the positive role of CRAs but also empha-
sized problems that warranted further action to ensure the CRAs performed responsi-
bly. Annex to the Call to CESR for Technical Advice on Possible Measures Concerning 
Credit Rating Agencies summarises main features of the European Parliament resolu-
tion (EC, 2004a): 
 
• Calls upon the Commission to undertake all necessary steps, including in par-
ticular a cost-benefit analysis of the effects on European capital markets, to as-
sess the establishment of a competent European Registration Scheme under the 
auspices of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) for the 
registration of rating agencies in Europe… 
• Calls on the Commission to submit, by 31 July 2005, its assessment of the 
need for appropriate legislative proposals to deal with the issues in the Parlia-
ment’s Resolution and to ensure that any provisions adopted are consistent with 
the review of capital requirements for banks and investment firms (Basel II) (EC, 
2004a). 
 
As shown above, the Resolution included the regulatory discussions on CRAs over the 
past years and overviewed possible registration regime for CRAs in the EU, requesting 
the EC to submit by 31 July 2005 its assessment of the need for appropriate legislative 
proposals (EC, 2004a). 
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The turning point for EU to take CRA regulations under serious considerations was the 
international consensus on a need to regulate CRAs’, reached by the G-20 leaders at 
the April 2009 summit (Garcia, 2012). In general terms CRAs were not regulated in 
Europe until 2011, when the European Union began requiring them to register with 
ESMA (Brooke, 2012). 
 
4.4 European Commission’s Communication 
 
In order to prepare its report to the European Parliament, the European Commission 
(EC) requested ESMA (CESR) to provide Technical Advice on Possible Measures con-
cerning Credit Rating Agencies to the EC published in March 2005. 
99. In terms of policy issues concerning CRAs methodologies, regulation could 
concern the content of methodologies and procedures and/or could establish 
conditions for an adequate disclosure to the public of these aspects. Moreover, 
the same issues could be addressed by self-regulation.  
 
OPTION C: REGISTRATION/RECOGNITION REGIMES “STRONG” AND 
“LIGHT” 214. “This option could involve:  
- a recognition that a CRA complies with a pre-determined set of criteria estab-
lished and published by EU authorities, without actually implying an authorisation 
to operate. Compliance with said criteria could be assessed by the party in 
charge of the recognition or implemented by a rather declarative procedure by 
CRAs. In this context recognition would not be a legal requirement for CRAs op-
erating in the EU market for the provision of ratings. Rather, applying for recogni-
tion would be voluntary (CESR 2005). 
 
In extracts above of CESR’s technical advice to the EC, published in March 2005, 
ESMA (CESR) proposed not regulating CRAs at the European level but for the time 
being adopting a system of self-regulation, with a monitoring of the degree to which 
CRAs applied the voluntary rules set out in the IOSCO Code (CESR, 2005). 
 
The EC did not present new proposals on CRAs, relying on existing financial services 
directives to provide guidance to all CRA related issues. Although, in 2006 the EC pub-
lished Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies that concluded 
that Market Abuse Directive and the Capital Requirements Directive amongst others 
combined with self-regulation by the CRAs using the IOSCO Code as fundamentals 
would be efficient enough to address the issues of CRAs (EC, 2006). 
 
3. RELEVANT REGULATION  
…While the Directives are legally binding, the Code works on a ‘comply or ex-
plain’ basis – i.e. credit rating agencies are expected to incorporate all the provi-
sions of the IOSCO Code into their own internal Codes of Conduct. Where they 
choose not to do this, they must explain how their Code nevertheless gives effect 
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to the provisions of the IOSCO Code… 
There are three FSAP Directives, which are relevant to credit rating agencies. the 
Market Abuse Directive (‘MAD’), which – together with its implementing Regula-
tion and Directives – tackles the issue of insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse)… 
The second item … is the Capital Requirements Directive (‘CRD’), which intro-
duces a new capital requirements framework for banks and investment firms. 
The CRD is based on the new international capital requirements framework 
agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (‘Basel II’) in 2004 (EC, 
2006). 
 
As the Official Journal of the EU extract above discloses, the EC found necessary to 
put forward legislative action, if there were great differences between EU rules and 
IOSCO code (EC, 2006). 
 
4.5 ESMA’s Documents on CRAs 
 
After the EC’s communication, ESMA (CESR) established a voluntary framework by 
which CRAs willing to join needed to inform ESMA (CESR) on yearly basis on their 
conformity with IOSCO Code. Fitch, Moody’s, S&P and Dominion Bond Rating Service 
(DBRS) decided to adjoin ESMA’s (CESR’s) proposal. 
 
In December 2006 ESMA (CESR) published its first report to the EC on the Compli-
ance of Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code. 
 
29. …CESR has found CRAs codes to deviate from the IOSCO, Code which are 
those related with the disclosure of methodologies, unsolicited ratings and con-
flicts of interests.   
41. There are two areas where the CRAs do not comply with the IOSCO Code… 
42. Ancillary services and the requirement for operational and legal separation of 
credit rating business and CRA analysts from any other businesses of the CRA 
that may present a conflict of interest as stated in provision 2.5 of the IOSCO 
Code. 46. The IOSCO Code does not literally define what unsolicited ratings 
are…(CESR, 2006). 
 
As shown above, the fragment of the report disclosed that agencies and IOSCO Code 
possessed extensively similar thinking. As of their differences, CRAs did not fully match 
with the IOSCO Code in areas of unsolicited ratings and ancillary services (CESR, 
2006). Ancillary services are not part of the credit rating activities: they comprise mar-
ket forecasts, estimates of economic trends, pricing analysis, and other general data 
analysis, as well as related distribution services (Garcia, 2012). 
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In May 2007, the EC requested of ESMA a second report specifically asking whether 
the recent events in financial markets made it advisable to modify the decision taken in 
2006 not to regulate CRAs. In an attempt to prevent regulation enforcement, a group of 
CRAs began working together in October 2007 on initiatives to enhance confidence in 
the credit rating process (Garcia, 2012). 
 
In May 2008 ESMA (CESR) published Second Report to the European Commission on 
the compliance of credit rating agencies with the IOSCO Code and The role of credit 
rating agencies in structured finance to the EC (CESR, 2008). As shown in the table 
below, ESMA’s (CESR’s) writing reflected parallel thinking with the upcoming Report to 
the European Commission on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies of the ESME, pub-
lished in June 2008 (ESME, 2008). 
 
The Role of CRAs by ESME and CESR Reported to the EC Compared      (Table 2) 
 
Table above discloses a passage of ESMA’s (CESR’s) report, which conveys a propo-
sition of maintaining the self-regulatory system by establishing an international body 
represented by supervisory authorities, CRAs and market participants. Those would 
monitor compliance with the IOSCO Code. In order to achieve consistency across all 
markets its rules should be agreed with the SEC and other countries bodies (CESR, 
ESMA, 2008). 
 
Report to the European 
Commission on the Role 
of Credit Rating Agen-
cies of the European 
Securities Markets Ex-
pert Group (ESME). 
Second Report to the European Commission on the compli-
ance of credit rating agencies with the IOSCO Code and The 
role of credit rating agencies in structured finance (CESR). 
• That an enhanced self-
regulatory model, as 
recommended hereun-
der, is made to work and 
is seen in the market to 
be effective.  
• That the existing CRAs 
facilitate in a substantive 
and constructive way the 
reduction in the barriers to 
entry thereby facilitating 
the establishment of new 
CRAs (ESME, 2008). 
230. … Market participants were very much in accordance with 
CESR’s assessment of the benefits and costs of the current self-
regulatory framework… 240. …Therefore the current self-
regulatory regime should be maintained possibly making 
the current informal CESR monitoring more effective or put-
ting in place a monitoring function at IOSCO level.  
245. This could be brought about by a special committee or body 
consisting of representatives from supervisory authorities, CRAs 
and market participants, with the task of monitoring compliance 
with the IOSCO Code –including if necessary sanctioning trans-
gressions- and possibly arbitrate cases of disagreements be-
tween market participants or supervisors and CRAs over the 
interpretation of the IOSCO Code. In order to achieve consisten-
cy across all major markets its composition should be agreed 
with the SEC and supervisors in other countries. Some respond-
ents thought this role could be played by IOSCO (CESR, 2008). 
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In March 2009 following the request of the EC ESMA (CESR) published its third report 
on Compliance of EU based Credit Rating Agencies with the 2008 IOSCO Code of 
Conduct. This report provided further analysis of the progress made by EU-based 
CRAs towards implementing the updated IOSCO Code (CESR, 2009). 
 
4. CESR’s overall conclusion with respect to the codes of conduct of the larger, 
global CRAs (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS and AM Best) is that they are broadly 
compliant with the IOSCO Code.  
6. With respect to the other EU CRAs, CESR – about a third have not adopted any 
code of conduct and strongly recommends that these CRAs consider implementing 
the IOSCO Code … 
7. CESR also identifies that the large majority of the CRAs which have adopted and 
published codes of conduct have not adopted the 2008 amendments to the IOSCO 
Code.  
8. Overall, CESR concludes that the EU CRAs that have adopted and published 
codes of conduct are broadly compliant with the 2004 IOSCO Code (CESR, 2009). 
 
ESMA’s overall conclusion with respect to the codes of conduct of the global CRAs 
(S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, and AM Best) was that they were broadly compliant with 
the IOSCO Code (CESR, 2009). 
 
With respect to the other 19 EU CRAs analysed, ESMA (CESR) identified that about a 
third had not adopted any code of conduct and, among those that had adopted and 
published codes the large majority were broadly compliant with the 2004 IOSCO Code 
but had not adopted the 2008 amendments to the IOSCO Code (CESR, 2009). 
 
4.6 European Commission’s Regulation Proposal 
 
On the basis of the IOSCO’s international standards of 2004 key market participants in 
securities favoured self-regulation. European governments considered establishing a 
more efficient supervision of CRAs. The EC decided to propose the introduction of leg-
islation on CRAs in the EU (Garcia, 2012). 
 
On 8 July 2008, EU finance ministers agreed in relation to CRAs on  
 
the principle of European regulations guaranteeing supervision of these agencies 
in the EU through registration. The Council asked the Commission to present it 
with specific proposals for implementing a European mechanism for registering 
credit rating agencies (Garcia, 2012). 
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Consequently, on 31 July 2008, the EC published Consultation document on a pro-
posal for a Directive/ Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
CRAs, proposing the adoption of a set of rules introducing substantive requirements for 
CRAs to respect to operate in the EU. The document included: authorization, supervi-
sion, and enforcement provisions, proposing two options for the EU: to reinforce 
ESMA’s role in order to enhance cooperation between national regulators or to estab-
lish a European agency (either ESMA or a new agency) for the EU-wide registration of 
CRAs (EC, 2008a). 
 
It was a priority to enforce legislation before the deadline agreed at G-20 level. A tight 
timetable was set to allow the EU Council and the EU Parliament to agree on the rules 
before the Parliament’s elections in June 2009. The EC published its formal proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on CRAs on 12 No-
vember 2008, accompanied by the proposal with four policy options (EC, 2008b): 
 
1. Self-regulation based on the IOSCO Code, on an industry ‘white paper’ or on 
initiatives by individual CRAs. 
2.  A voluntary European code of conduct for CRAs developed by the industry 
based on the ‘comply or explain* principle, together with a monitoring body that 
would check compliance with the code. 
3.  A Commission’s Recommendation setting standards that CRAs would have to 
comply with to operate in the EU but without an enforcement mechanism. 
4.  EU legislation introducing a registration procedure and substantive require-
ments (EC, 2008b). 
 
The EC’s conclusion was that legislation was the best alternative. On 17 November 
2009 the Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU (EC, 2009). 
 
4.7 CRA Supervisory Structure in the EU 
4.7.1 Colleges of Supervisors 
 
There were three options for supervision (from lesser to greater degree of harmoniza-
tion) by:  
1. Home Member State. 
2. Several countries (through colleges of supervisors) coordinated by ESMA. 
3. A possibility of the European agency. 
 
A compromise was a mixed system: supervision and registration decisions had to be 
discussed by several institutions (college of supervisors and ESMA) prior to their adop-
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tion by the competent authority of the home Member State. The EU Regulation, which 
set up a system of colleges of supervisors, was approved in November 2009. The main 
harmonizing force was the European Parliament, which at that time was unable to 
launch a European agency for the CRAs supervision. However, a clause of labelling 
the Regulation model as temporary was included, according to the Report of the High-
Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU by De Larosière Group (De Larosière 
Group, 2009). 
 
4.7.2 The Operation of Colleges  
 
Colleges set up by European supervisors were in charge of the registration and super-
vision of EU CRAs from June 2010 until July 2011. The colleges handled the applica-
tions for registration from European CRAs when the CRA Regulation became effective. 
Among those applicants were the EU subsidiaries of the major international CRAs. The 
European CRAs had to register with ESMA (formerly CESR) by 7 September 2010 
(CESR, 2010). A total of 45 legal entities registered in the EU within the set date. EU 
competent authorities formed six colleges of supervisors and were obliged to coordi-
nate with each other (CESR, 2010). 
 
The decision to register an agency required unanimity of members of the college. In the 
event of disagreement the Regulation provided an appeal process to ESMA (CESR). 
Otherwise, ESMA (CESR) resolved all the other issues. In June 2010 ESMA (CESR) 
published a more extended guidance on registration (CESR, 2010). 
 
In its report published in December 2010, ESMA (CESR) included a first assessment of 
the functioning of the colleges of competent authorities, concluding that  
 
The operation of these frameworks has revealed some difficulties mainly linked 
to the problem of ensuring consistency… (CESR, 2010). 
 
The CRA Regulation posed a challenge for national authorities that had to set up regis-
tration and supervision of CRAs in a very short time frame, especially given that al-
ready in July 2011 ESMA took over all supervisory activities over CRAs (CESR, 2010). 
 
4.8 ESMA Regulation Competencies 
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On 1 January 2011 the new European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) was 
established to unify the members of financial supervision at a national and the EU lev-
el. The ESFS is composed of the supervisory authorities of the Member States and 
four new bodies: ESMA, EBA, EIOPA, and ESRB5 (ESMA, 2013b). 
 
4.8.1 Registration and Supervision of CRAs 
 
The amendment to the CRA Regulation adopted in 1st July 2011 (CRA Regulation II), 
conferred on ESMA all registration and supervision duties. The powers previously 
granted to the competent authorities of the Member States were terminated on that 
date. ESMA was given the authority to: 
 Get an access all necessary information on CRAs. 
 Examine any procedures and data including telephone calls. 
 Interview or summon and hear a person. 
 Carry out on-site inspections at the premises of CRAs. 
 
In the case of an breaches committed by a CRA, ESMA is empowered to: 
 Require the CRA to bring the breach to an end. 
 Suspend the use of ratings for regulatory purposes. 
 Temporarily prohibit the CRAs from issuing ratings. 
 Withdraw the registration. 
 Impose a fine or a periodic penalty payment (Garcia, 2012). 
 
4.8.2 Fees on CRAs 
 
According to Article 19 of the CRA Regulation, ESMA shall charge fees, which cover 
the costs of registration and supervision of CRAs. Article 19 requires the EC to adopt a 
regulation on fees following two principles: the fees collected shall fully cover ESMA's 
expenditure necessary for its supervisory activities; and the amount of the fees charged 
to individual CRAs shall be proportionate to the turnover of the CRA concerned. In May 
2011, ESMA published its Technical Advice to the Commission on Fees for CRAs re-
ferred to in Article 19. Following fees are issued: 
 Registration. 
                                               
5
 See Literature review, Section 2.5 European Supervisory Framework for more information. 
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 Certification. 
 Two supervisory fees: 
o On-going supervision of registered CRAs. 
o Supervision of certified CRAs (ESMA, 2011). 
 
Registration fees per complexity of the application and size of the applicant are 
demonstrated below. 
 
Registration Fees per Complexity and Size of the Applicant                       (Table 3) 
 
ESMA, “ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on Fees for CRAs.” May 2011, 
<http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_144.pdf>. 
 
4.8.3 Cooperation and Exchange of Information 
 
Article 26 of the CRA Regulation insists on cooperation with a straightforward mandate:  
ESMA, EBA, EIOPA, the competent authorities and the sectorial competent au-
thorities shall cooperate where it is necessary for the purposes of this Regulation 
and for those of the relevant sectorial legislation (EC, 2011).  
 
According to Article 32.2, all the information under the Regulation is confidential. How-
ever, it will not be considered confidential information if the authority or body concerned  
states at the time of communication that such information may be disclosed or 
where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings (EC, 2009). 
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The Regulation allows ESMA to communicate the information, if relevant for the per-
formance of their tasks, to a limited number of authorities or bodies:  
the central banks, the European System of Central Banks and the ECB, in their 
capacity as monetary authorities, the ESRB and, where appropriate, to other 
public authorities responsible for overseeing payment and settlement systems. 
(EC, 2009)  
 
The Regulation expects such authorities to communicate to ESMA information that it 
may need to carry out its duties under the Regulation. 
 
4.8.4 Delegation of tasks 
 
Possible tasks that may be delegated include the power to carry out information re-
quests and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections. However, Article 30.4 
sets some limits on delegation: main  
supervisory responsibilities according to this Regulation, including registration 
decisions, final assessments and follow-up decisions concerning infringements, 
shall not be delegated (EC, 2011). 
 
4.8.5 Notifications and Suspension Requests 
 
The Regulation envisages the possibility and obligation for competent authorities to 
inform ESMA of breaches. The requests of competent authorities to suspend the use of 
the ratings for regulatory purposes of the CRAs concerned are handled based on the 
information provided, and if ESMA considers that the request is justified, “it shall take 
the appropriate measures to resolve the issue”. However, where according to ESMA 
the request is not justified, it will inform the notifying competent authority in writing, set-
ting out the reasons for not taking supervisory actions (Garcia, 2012). 
 
4.8.6 Cooperation with Authorities from Third Countries 
 
According to Article 34, ESMA may conclude cooperation agreements on exchange of 
information with the competent authorities of third countries for the performance of their 
respective tasks. These agreements are possible if the information disclosed is subject 
to guarantees of professional secrecy. The common EU rules on data protection will 
apply in the situations where ESMA is to transfer personal data to a third country au-
thority (EC, 2001). 
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Article 35 pronounces, that the information may be disclosed if supervisory authority 
gave its agreement or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings 
 
At a global level, IOSCO provides supervisors with a multilateral forum that enables 
them to share information regularly as to the rules and approaches they adopt in im-
plementing the IOSCO Code of Conduct and in regulating CRAs generally. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis analysis shows, that Europe has taken a tremendous initiative and a great 
effort to impose regulations and monitor CRAs in a short time frame, in order to prevent 
financial destabilisation. The high-pace rate that was observed in the past will continue 
in the future as it seems that CRAs will not jump off the regulatory agenda, at least for 
the next couple of years (Garcia, 2012). On the international level, G-20 and FSB are 
currently working on how to end mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings, to foster the de-
velopment and use of market participants’ own risk assessments as well as to address 
the transparency issue, the conflict of interests and competition issues (G-20, 2013b). 
 
Similarly, like the blueprint calls for setting up an international non-profit CRA – INCRA 
to reduce concerns about conflicts of interest that are often levelled at for-profit rating 
agencies (Mackenzie, 2013), Europe has been considering a European CRA. Howev-
er, the EC already gives an answer to this proposal: an analysis showed that setting up 
a CRA with public money would be costly (€300-500 million over a period of five years), 
could raise concerns regarding the CRA’s credibility especially if a publicly funded CRA 
would rate the Member States, and put private CRAs at a comparative disadvantage 
(EC, 2013b). Thus, the European CRA is for now a subject for debates. 
 
Nowadays, issuer-pays CRAs not only derive their revenues from issuers, they also 
have revenues from subscribers that pay to get more in-depth analysis that supports 
the ratings. However, moving to a system of revenues coming only from subscribers 
could potentially undermine CRAs’ revenue, and thus the quality and the coverage of 
ratings. It is also worth noting that if issuers do not pay for the ratings they might be 
less willing to provide confidential information to CRAs, thereby leading to ratings of 
lesser quality or to reduced coverage by CRAs if the agencies consider that they do not 
have sufficient information to support a rating. However, the new Regulation contains a 
new obligation for the Commission to re-assess by 2016 the risks of conflicts of interest 
due to the issuer-pays remuneration model, based on a technical advice of the ESMA 
(EC, 2013b). 
 
A long relationship between a CRA and an issuer could undermine the CRA's inde-
pendence and in view of the "issuer pays" model lead to a conflict of interest that could 
affect the quality of ratings. The Regulation introduces a mandatory rotation rule forcing 
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issuers of structured finance products with underlying re-securitised assets, who utilise 
"issuer pays model", to switch to a different agency every four years. Mandatory rota-
tion would not be a requirement for the endorsement and equivalence assessment of 
third country CRAs. To this end the rotation rule limits the duration of a contract be-
tween a CRA and an issuer. While the Commission had proposed a broader scope, the 
compromise limits the rotation rule to re-securitisations. By end-2016, the Commission 
will report back to the EP on the effectiveness of the rotation rule with a view to extend-
ing the scope if appropriate (EC, 2013b). 
 
One of the weaknesses of the current EU legal framework remains the over-reliance on 
CRAs’ ratings. The already adopted measures to supervise CRAs’ activities should 
reduce market participants’ absolute faith on CRAs assessments, as has been the 
case in the EU sovereign debt crisis. On other issues, proposing new rules, without 
leaving time for assessing the impact of the existing legislation, can entail the risk of 
over-regulating the CRA industry. As the time progresses, ESMA will perhaps gain 
more experience to address the concerns relating to the CRAs’ activities (Garcia, 
2012). 
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List of Common Abbreviations 
 
ABCP Asset-backed commercial papers 
ABS Asset-backed securities 
AM Best A.M. Best Company, Inc. 
AMF Autorité des Marches Financiers 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
CDO Collateralized debt obligations 
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors 
CEREP Central Repository 
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CGFS Committee on the Global Financial System 
CMBS Commercial mortgage-backed securities 
CRA Credit rating agency 
CRAs Credit rating agencies 
CRD Capital Requirement Directives 
DBRS DBRS, Limited 
EBA European Banking Authority 
EC European Commission 
ECA Export credit agencies 
ECAI External Credit Assessment Institution 
ECB European Central Bank 
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
ESMA European Securities Markets Authority (previously CESR) 
EU European Union 
Fitch Fitch Rating, Ltd 
FSB Financial Stability Board (previously FSF – Financial Stability  
Forum) 
G-20 The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank  
Governors 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
Moody’s Moody’s Investor Services, Inc. 
NRSRO Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
RMBS Residential mortgage-backed securities 
SEC US Securities and Exchange Commission 
S&P Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services 
Standard & Poor’s  Standard & Poor's Ratings Services 
USA United States of America 
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A complete Ranking of the Changes in Credit Ratings Since 2007 
Country 
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Greece -11,00 A CCC -11 A B- -10 A1 C -12 
Cyprus -10,67 A+ B -10 A CCC+ -11 A2 Caa3 -11 
Portugal -8,67 AA BB+ -8 AA- BB -8 Aa2 Ba3 -10 
Spain -8,67 AAA BBB -8 AAA BBB- -9 Aaa Baa3 -9 
Ireland -8,00 AAA BBB+ -7 AAA BBB+ -7 Aaa Ba1 -10 
Iceland -6,33 AA- BBB -5 A+ BBB- -5 Aaa Baa3 -9 
Egypt -4,67 BB+ B -4 BB+ B- -5 Ba1 B3 -5 
Slovenia -4,67 AA A- -4 AA A- -4 Aa2 Baa2 -6 
Italy -4,33 AA- BBB+ -4 A+ BBB+ -3 Aa2 Baa2 -6 
Hungary -4,00 BBB+ BB+ -3 BBB+ BB -4 A2 Ba1 -5 
Latvia -2,67 A- BBB -2 A- BBB -2 A2 Baa3 -4 
Lithuania -2,67 A BBB -3 A BBB -3 A2 Baa1 -2 
Jamaica -2,33 B+ RD -3 B SD -2 B1 B3 -2 
El Salvador -2,00 BB+ BB -1 BB+ BB- -2 Baa3 Ba3 -3 
Ukraine -2,00 BB- B -2 BB- B -2 B1 B3 -2 
Bahrain -1,67 A- BBB -2 A BBB -3    
Barbados -1,67    BBB+ BB+ -3 Baa2 Ba1 -2 
Pakistan -1,67    B+ B- -2 B1 Caa1 -3 
San Marino -1,67 AA BBB+ -5       
Tunisia -1,67 BBB BB+ -2 BBB BB -3    
Belgium -1,33 AA+ AA -1 AA+ AA -1 Aa1 Aa3 -2 
Vietnam -1,33 BB- B+ -1 BB BB- -1 Ba3 B2 -2 
Bahamas -1,00    A- BBB -2 A3 Baa1 -1 
Croatia -1,00 BBB- BBB- 0 BBB BB+ -2 Baa3 Ba1 -1 
Fiji -1,00    B+ B -1 Ba2 B1 -2 
Argentina -0,67 RD CC 0 B+ B- -2 B3 B3 0 
Belarus -0,67    B+ B- -2    
Bermuda -0,67 AA+ AA -1 AA AA- -1    
Botswana -0,67    A A- -1 A1 A2 -1 
France -0,67 AAA AAA 0 AAA AA+ -1 Aaa Aa1 -1 
Mali -0,67 B-   B NR -2    
New Zealand -0,67 AA+ AA -1 AA+ AA -1 Aaa Aaa 0 
Romania -0,67 BBB BBB- -1 BBB- BB+ -1 Baa3 Baa3 0 
Seychelles -0,67  B  B NR -2    
South Africa -0,67 BBB+ BBB -1 BBB+ BBB -1 Baa1 Baa1 0 
Venezuela -0,67 BB- B+ -1 BB- B+ -1 B2 B2 0 
Austria -0,33 AAA AAA 0 AAA AA+ -1 Aaa Aaa 0 
Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 
-0,33       B2 B3 -1 
Bulgaria -0,33 BBB BBB- -1 BBB+ BBB -1 Baa3 Baa2 1 
Cook Islands -0,33    BB- B+ -1    
Ghana -0,33 B+ B+ 0 B+ B -1    
Isle of Man -0,33    AAA AA+ -1    
Macedonia -0,33 BB+ BB+ 0 BB+ BB -1    
Malta -0,33 A A+ 1 A BBB+ -2 A3 A3 0 
Montenegro -0,33    BB BB- -1    
Russia -0,33 BBB+ BBB -1 BBB+ BBB -1 Baa2 Baa1 1 
UK -0,33 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aa1 -1 
US -0,33 AAA AAA 0 AAA AA+ -1 Aaa Aaa 0 
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Canada 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Denmark 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Finland 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Germany 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Grenada -0,33    B- CCC+     
Guatemala 0,33 BB+ BB+ 0   -1 Ba2 Ba1 1 
Japan 0,00 AA A+ -2    A2 Aa3 2 
Luxembourg 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Mexico 0,00 BBB BBB 0    Baa1 Baa1 0 
Mongolia 0,33 B+ B+ 0 B+ BB-     
Netherlands 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Norway 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Slovakia 0,00 A A+ 1 A A 0 A1 A2 -1 
Sweden 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Switzerland 0,00 AAA AAA 0 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Australia 0,33 AA+ AAA 1 AAA AAA 0 Aaa Aaa 0 
Cameroon 0,33 B B 0 B- B 1    
Czech Republic 0,33 A A+ 1    A1 A1 0 
Georgia 0,33  BB-  B+ BB- 1    
Kazakhstan 0,33 BBB BBB+ 1    Baa2 Baa2 0 
Kuwait 0,33 AA- AA 1       
Mauritius 0,33       Baa2 Baa1 1 
Moldova 0,33 B-      Caa1 B3 1 
Nicaragua 0,33       Caa1 B3 1 
Oman 0,33    A- A 1    
Rwanda 0,33 B- B 1       
Trinidad 0,33    A- A 1 Baa1 Baa1 0 
Azerbaijan 0,67 BB BBB- 2  BBB-     
Costa Rica 0,67 BB BB+ 1  BB  Ba1 Baa3 1 
Ecuador 0,67 B- B- 0 CCC+ B 2 Caa1 Caa1 0 
India 0,67 BBB- BBB- 0    Ba2 Baa3 2 
Poland 0,67 BBB+ A- 1 BBB+ A- 1 A2 A2 0 
Dominican Rep 1,00 B B 0 B B+ 1 B3 B1 2 
Estonia 1,00 A A+ 1 A AA- 2 A1 A1 0 
Paraguay 1,00  BB-  B- BB- 3    
Qatar 1,00    A+ AA 2 Aa3 Aa2 1 
Colombia 1,33 BB BBB- 2    Ba2 Baa3 2 
Israel 1,33 A- A 1 A- A+ 2 A2 A1 1 
Lebanon 1,33 B- B 1 B- B 1 B3 B1 2 
Philippines 1,33 BB BB+ 1    B1 Ba1 3 
Saudi Arabia 1,33 A+ AA- 1 A+ AA- 1 A2 Aa3 2 
Suriname 1,33 B BB- 2 B BB- 2    
Chile 1,67 A A+ 1 A AA- 2 A2 Aa3 2 
China 1,67 A A+ 1 A AA- 2 A2 Aa3 2 
S Korea 1,67 A+ AA- 1 A A+ 1 A3 Aa3 3 
Hong Kong 2,00 AA- AA+ 2 AA AAA 2 Aa3 Aa1 2 
Turkey 2,00 BB- BBB- 3 BB- BB 1 Ba3 Ba1 2 
Panama 2,33 BB+ BBB 2 BB BBB 3 Ba1 Baa2 2 
Peru 2,67 BB+ BBB 2 BB+ BBB 2 Ba3 Baa2 4 
Bolivia 3,00 B- BB- 3 B- BB- 3 B3 Ba3 3 
Brazil 3,00 BB BBB 3 BB BBB 3 Ba2 Baa2 3 
Indonesia 3,00 BB- BBB- 3 BB- BB+ 2 B1 Baa3 4 
Uruguay 3,67 B+ BB+ 3 B+ BBB- 4 B1 Baa3 4 
 
